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ActorsThe idea of a constitution of networks may be a useful addition to our ways of understanding what happens
within the business landscape. We describe a constitution of networks as a system of values, norms, rules and
other conventions that are shared by actors in business networks. Whether by intention or not, the
constitution of networks provides a framework within which interaction among actors takes place. We argue
that companies invest in the selection and replication of interaction practices that evolve over time as
customs or common use. This involves interaction aimed at developing or accessing resources for future use
in the relationships between actors. In this way, the constitution of networks circumscribes the actors'
appreciations and expectations about how they and others should conduct business.
This study is based on empirical research conducted between 2002 and 2005 in business networks of
consumer goods in the United Kingdom. Significant actors include multinational consumer goods companies,
large grocery retailers, consumers and public authorities.© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Why we need to study the constitution of networks
This empirical study is about the constitution of networks. We use
the term ‘constitution’ to encapsulate a higher-order of multiple
conventions that are customary, expected and often self-enforcing
within particular business networks (Buchanan, 1975, 1978, 1988;
Lewis, 1967; Young, 1993). A higher-order of conventions imply a
shared system of values, norms and rules that transcends any single
organization or dyadic relationship. Therefore, we also use the term
‘network’ as a metaphor to describe the structure of exchange rela-
tionships and interdependencies withinwhich a process of interaction
among actors takes place (Anderson, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994;
Ford & Håkansson, 2006; Gadde, Huemer, & Håkansson, 2003;
Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Ritter, 2000).
Imagine a ‘network’ context for production and distribution of
business products or services in which no customary rules and
expected principles guided the actors' behavior. In this situation, raw
material suppliers, component manufacturers, equipment suppliers,
logistics companies, wholesalers, consultants and service contractors
would buy and sell goods and services without reliance on any shared
system of conventions: there would be no contracts; no invoices; no
credit, no rules of negotiation; no statutory regulations; no rules
regarding fair trade; no quality controls; no industry standards; nozas),
l rights reserved.courts; no trade associations and arbitrations; no predefined patterns
of advertising and promotions; no brand reputations; no warranties;
no specified interface for logistics; no accounting standards; no
property rights and no overt or covert collusion between companies.
Consequently, no actor would conform to a particular pattern of
behavior in a network like this and no one would expect others to
conform to some previously learned pattern. No one would want to
conform, given that no one else conforms (Lewis, 1967; Young, 1993).
In short, this imaginary network would have no constitution.
What would be the problem for actors who participated in a
network like this? The problem would not simply be the existence of
anarchy, but rather the inherent difficulty for actors of interactingwith
each other; thereby, the possibility of business taking place between
actors would be severely constrained (Casson, 1982; Choi, 1993;
Loasby, 2000). The resources that actors need for their operations are
not usually available in a concentrated form. Instead, they are widely
dispersed and owned by other actors (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003).
In the amorphous topology of a network without a constitution that
we have described, appropriate resources may not be identified by
potential buying or selling businesses. Hence, companies would face
prohibitive costs in terms of the time and effort needed to access other
actors, to negotiate the terms for interaction, to conclude andmanifest
deals and to oversee and enforce agreements. Furthermore, the
existence of information asymmetries among actors would impose
huge uncertainties and incremental barriers to the conclusion of
informed and voluntary exchange (Akerlof, 1970; Maskin & Tirole,
1999; Tirole, 1986, 1999). In the absence of a shared system of
conventions among actors, information asymmetry and symmetric
ignorance of business opportunities would prevent actors from deal-
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advantageous interdependence on which their businesses depend
(Ford & Håkansson, 2006).
The existence of shared systems of conventions has been evident in
trade from the earliest times. For example, markets in each medieval
city in England were created, organized and managed within a
network of actors that included the King who provided a franchise;
the police who provided security; the judiciary and parliament that
resolved disputes and provided a legal framework; producers,
merchants, carriers, vendors and their customers who bought and
sold to each other on a regular basis (Coase, 1988). Thus, interactions
were structured within a constitution. A constitution ensures
behavioral regularities which sustain themselves as they serve the
interests of the actors involved. More formally, a constitution supplies
actors with the rules of the game or the humanly devised constraints
that shape human interaction, whether political, social, or economic
(Lewis, 1967; North, 1990).
Extant research has provided significant insight into the nature of
these terms (Buchanan, 1988; Casson, 1982; Helgesson & Kjellberg,
2005; Loasby, 2000; Sabel, 1993, 1997; Slater, 2002). However,
previous research raises questions about the real-life form of the
constitution of networks and the dialectic relation between the
constitutional make-up of business networks and interactions among
actors. A significant part of extant research is conceptual and does not
provide empirical insights on how a multiplicity of values, norms and
rules is manifested in business networks. Previous research empha-
sizes that actors develop factual, physical and social conventions to
facilitate complex interactions and thus create significant outcomes in
the form of network assets (Cornes & Sandler, 1986; Johanson &
Mattsson, 1985). But we know very little about how these network
assets are created and used by related actors.
Our objective in this study is to examine the idea of the consti-
tution of networks through the interactions of participants and some
of the apparent outcomes within an economically important network.
In particular, the present study attempts to provide a preliminary
approach to the following research question:
How are the interactions of business actors affected by and how
do they affect the constitution of networks?
The paper is based on empirical research conducted between
2002 and 2005 in the network context for production and
distribution of consumer goods in the United Kingdom. Significant
actors in this business network include multinational consumer
goods companies, large grocery retailers, public authorities and
consumers. The paper provides information on aspects of the
constitution of this network and discusses its relevance. The
empirical research suggests that actors invest in the selection and
replication of interaction practices that evolve over time as customs
or common use. Investing in these practices is a time-consuming
task: it involves interaction to develop or access resources for future
use in relationships between participants. It may also involve
investment in developing and implementing wider social and
political practices and the pressures to enforce them (McCammon,
1964; Palamountain, 1955).
Examining the constitution of networks through the lens of actors'
interactions brings three important benefits: Firstly, examining
interactions can help us to understand the extent to which there is
some overall commonality within a constitution of networks and also
the extent of diversity of views and practice that are shown
(Kriesberg, 1955; Wittreich, 1962). Secondly, the idea of constitution
of networks can help us understand something of the structure of
networks as interconnected exchange relationships and interdepen-
dencies. Thirdly, analyzing interaction can help in understanding the
process of business networks and particularly the re-ordering and re-
confirming of interaction patterns.2. Intellectual origins and previous research
The idea of a business network centers not on the action of single
actors in an anonymous environment, but on a process of interaction
between individually significant and interdependent actors (Easton &
Håkansson, 1996; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Håkansson & Ford,
2002). The uneven distribution of resources and skills among actors
creates the need to rely on the resources and skills of others. These
interdependencies lead to continuing and frequently complex
exchange relationships between networks of actors. Exchange
relationships form an underlying ontology in marketing theory
(Alderson, 1957, 1965; Bagozzi, 1975, 1978; Håkansson, 1982; Houston
& Gassenheimer, 1987; Hunt, 1976, 1983). Companies, for example,
enter exchange relationships when they perceive that value can be
created and captured according to their specific interests and aims.
Early marketing theory was much concerned with how exchange
relationships contribute to themake-up of the business landscape (for
example, Alderson, 1957; Ridgeway, 1957; Stigler, 1951; Vaile, Grether,
& Cox, 1952). This landscape does not simply consist of the exchange
relationships between specific companies; it is also based on
conventions, ranging from cultural customs to laws which constrain
and enable exchange (Khalil, 1995; Kjellberg, 2001). Similarly,
interaction among actors is a complex process that does not occur in
a vacuum. Interactions are also based on a set of explicit or implicit
rules and principles that guide actors' business behavior.
Schelling (1960) observed that actors achieve much better
interaction and coordination of their efforts when they are able to
rely upon focal points. He defined focal points as a set of mutually
perceived expectations, shared appreciations or preoccupations,
obsessions and sensitivities. In a series of experimental studies,
Schelling (1960) asked individuals to imagine a situation in which
they were unable to communicate but wanted to meet each other in
New York. The majority of respondents chose Grand Central Station
because this place at that time provided a “focal point for each
person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be
expected to do” (Schelling, 1960, p. 57). Mehta, Starmer, and Sudgen
(1994) repeated Schelling's (1960) experimental investigation in a
more formal setting with incentives in which they confirmed that
actors are more successful at coordination if they rely on a set of
prominent and salient points.
Focal points emphasize the fact that in a continuing interaction
process, the precedent becomes extremely important. The idea of
precedent means that if a particular problem of practice X is settled in
case C, then the rationale in case C would be applied by later actors to
practice X. In other words, case C sets a precedent in relation to
practice X. Actors attempt to co-ordinate their practices to their
mutual benefit by drawing on focal points which are ‘prominent’ and
‘salient’ ways of mutually perceived expectations (Schelling, 1960;
Sudgen,1995). They often articulate these prominent and salient ways
as rules: ‘Implicit or explicit rules of expected behavior that embody
actors' preferences’ (Nee, 1998, p. 87). There is a subtle, though
important, difference between duty-imposing rules and power-
conferring rules (Hart, 1961). The latter confer power on individuals
to vary their initial position and enable them tomodify or re-negotiate
some of their own duties. Contractual arrangements, for example, may
also confer discretion on parties to make the best use of their
capacities and exercise their powers under specified criteria. A
traditional distinction since Roman times has been between ius
strictum (i.e. mandatory rules) and ius dispositivum (i.e. yielding
rules); this differentiation corresponds to the contemporary distinc-
tion between mandatory and default rules (Ayres & Gertner, 1989;
Riley, 2000). In another way, Esser (1956) differentiates between
‘Rule’ (Norm) and ‘Principle’ (Grundsatz). The continuous replication
of existing practices by companies leads to the development of
principles which operate as ‘optimization commands’ over time
(Dworkin, 1967) and the characteristic norms of conduct will owe
1 Elsewhere we have referred to these views as ‘network pictures’ (Ford et al., 2003).
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and principles may therefore, limit the types of relationships inwhich
the companies are able to participate (Håkansson & Ford, 2002). They
increase the ‘predictability’ of group members' behavior and give
expression to a group's ‘central values’ (Feldman, 1984, p. 47).
Constitutional theories occupy a ‘conditional platform of under-
standing’ (Loughlin, 2005, p.186) because they build on actors' central
values; they try to draw upon bases of agreement that exist among
actors and apply those ‘agreed-upon principles to resolve more
controversial issues’ (Strauss, 1999, p. 581). For example, constitutions
may specify the nature of the rights that individual actors may
possess, acquire or transfer. Therefore, the legitimacy of constitutions
is based upon the evolution of consent among related actors over time
(Barnett, 1986, 2003). Companies, for example, may agree with each
other on a number of issues such as information sharing, work
sharing, domain consensus, lobbying, price fixing, competitive
behavior, reciprocity and co-operation etc. and their agreements are
continuously redefined or re-adjusted over time.
The expression of central values as a higher-order constitution
infers formality. Thus, it is common for the constitutions of networks
to include externally imposed, but accepted laws or legal agreements
made by members e.g. standards or agreed norms of trading in the
members of a trade association (Amstutz, 2005; Sabel, 1993, 1997).
But this formality does not imply that constitutions are the opposite of
an informal substance of practice. The formality of constitutions is an
abstraction that aims to preservewhat is important in the substance of
practice over time. Stinchcombe (2001) uses the example of gasoline
and lubricating oil which is not the opposite of crude oil but refined
versions of it; “formality when it works is not the opposite of informal
substance but the refined version or versions of it” (Stinchcombe,
2001, p. 3). Therefore, Stinchcombe (2001) advances three criteria to
assess how formality works in practice. Firstly, the formality must be
‘cognitively adequate’ to grasp the reality it represents. Secondly,
formality has to be communicated to involved actors. Thirdly,
formality must be able to change as reality changes. In this sense,
the formality of constitutions serves to represent and govern the
actors' practice. It guides the way actors relate to each other and it is
constantly reshaped and reconfirmed by the practice of the involved
actors.
3. A model for the study of constitutions of networks
We now propose a theoretical model for the study of constitutions
of networks consisting of three conceptual dimensions. This considers
the constitution of networks as a high order of multiple conventions
which are determined by three elementary forces: a) multilateral
interaction, b) focal frames and c) recursive time.
3.1. Multilateral interaction
One of the primary characteristics of interaction is that it is relative
(Ford & Håkansson, 2006). In other words, actors interact and deploy
their individual resources and abilities differently in different
relationships. The value of actors' resources varies depending on
where and how they are deployed. It is through multilateral
interaction that individual resources are activated (Slater, 2002).
Hence, multilateral interaction among individually significant actors
introduces complexity into the make-up of business networks and
creates the need for actors to enhance transparency and governability.
In economic terms, the current value of one particular interaction can
be articulated as the net present value of all expected future benefits
and sacrifices. This sum of the future stream of benefits and sacrifices
must be discounted by the opportunity cost, which is the cost of not
investing in other exchange opportunities of similar systematic risk in
other relationships (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Interaction among
actors may also include non-economic ‘give-and-take’ processes(Easton & Araujo, 1992); they may be task-specific as well as non
task-specific. A typical pattern of interaction among companies
nowadays will comprise several give-and-take processes at head-
quarter as well as at regional levels, plus a plethora of related
information exchanges, often with third parties such as trade
associations, courts, professional communities and public bodies.
Consider, for instance, the multilateral interactions between two
companies in the area of distribution management that involves
several stock-keeping units, services, delivery, replenishment, price,
timing as well as communication and information systems for order
processing, implementation and billing (Buzzell & Ortmeyer, 1995).
Each investment in the facilitation of such complex, multilateral
interaction generates significant externalities in the form of network
assets. These network assets encompass the factual, physical and
social conventions that surround exchanges; they are, in other words,
goods that can be used by other related actors in the conclusion of new
exchanges (Cornes & Sandler, 1986; Johanson & Mattsson, 1985;
Romer, 1990).
3.2. Focal frames
Actors do notmerely exchangewith each other; they also construct
the forms in which future interactions may happen (Cooper, 1992). In
this sense, focal frames are refined versions of the sedimented
experience of previous exchanges. While experience is backward-
looking, focal frames are forward-looking. Focal frames are active and
collective forms of rules and principles that guide the direction of
change within relationships; they transform interaction among actors
into “continual, joint formulations of common ends” (Sabel, 1994,
p.138). They are not developed in a single relationship in isolation, but
are built upon each actor's wider view of the interactions in which it
and others are engaged (Ford, Gadde, Håkansson, & Snehota, 2003).1
Focal frames serve as an abstraction that preserves the substance of
interaction among actors (Stinchcombe, 2001). A contract, for
example, is a formalized manifestation of an interaction to which
two parties have agreed (Buckley, 2005; Steyn, 1997). The parties to a
contract aim to achieve future outcomes; they anticipate and
‘presentiate’ future results which are abstracted into a focal frame.
Atiyah (1986) uses the term ‘futurity’ to describe this focal frame as a
process of discounting future results to the present. Furthermore, a
range of technologies of thought such as legislation, plans, drafts,
numbers and formulas may also result in focal frames and thereby,
render a field of practice knowable calculable and administrable
(Miller & Rose, 1990).
3.3. Recursive time
Business is not a collection of isolated, non-related transactions.
Instead, interaction between companies is both multi-faceted and
takes place over time as a recurrent pattern of episodes within
continuously evolving relationships. Recurrent episodes are affected
by the perceptions of the participants of their previous interactions
and by their expectations of the future. Relationships between actors
may become long-term (Ford, 1978). But even in this case, ‘relation-
ship time’ does not appear as a linear process but as recursive practice.
Habits and institutionalized forms of inter-firm interactions are
manifestations of recursive time. Examples include periodic business
or task reviews and annual negotiations between suppliers and
customers. An important aspect of recursive time is that the time
perspectives of different actors are often not aligned. Each actor may
have a quite different view of the actual or desirable evolution or
Table 1











Annual trade negotiations Official registration within public
bodies such as trade associations, e.g.
licenses, patents, EAN-code, taxes.
Umbrella agreements Consumer protection regulations
Trade allowances
Sourcing of raw material Packaging information
regarding ingredients,
weight, and health warnings
Restrictions on the sale
of tobacco and alcohol
and drug products
Food and health specifications
Operations Rolling forecast and plans Assortment Opening hours Location of the production/outlets
Production of standardized
packaging sizes and shipping
cases
Product items Assortment Environmental standards
Product items Labor law, health and safety
Annual trade negotiations Annual negotiations
(during Sept.–Dec.)
Contract and competition law
Umbrella agreements Practice in good faith
Listing of products Statute law/public policy
Trade allowances Fair trade standards
Supply management Electronic data interchange Information to consumers
regarding expiring dates
Merchandising of products
Continuous stock replenishment Replenishment
Vendor managed inventory Club membership
Category management Category as a businesses unit Consumer insight (consumer










Efficient consumer response Efficiency gains in: Consumer insight (consumer
buying behavior in general)
Shopper insight (consumer
buying behavior at the
point-of-sale)
Joint trade and industry body
– Assortments Market research agencies
(e.g. AC Nielsen, GfK)
– Promotions Trade associations
– Replenishment Chambers of Commerce
– Introductions
Invoicing 30 days delay of payment by
the retailers




Manufacturer brands Listing of brands Focus groups with consumers
advertising of brands through
promotions customer service
Point-of-sale promotion Property rights
Promotional support at the
point-of-sale
Advertising of brands through TV,
radio, out-of home, PR promotions
Consumer promotion Registrations
Merchandising activities at the
point-of-sale
Customer service Competition law
Brand visibility Advertising restrictions
Ethics and communication standards






Promotional support at the
point-of-sale
Brand visibility Competition law
Merchandising activities Advertising restrictions
Brand visibility Ethics and communication standards
Pre-estimates Cost pre-estimates











Quarterly business reviews Periodic renewal of licenses
Periodic reviews
Guarantee/liability Manufacturer' guarantees to
deliver quality of products
and obligation to remedy




Retailers' guaranty to deliver
quality of products and
obligation to remedy
deficiencies in products or
other services.
Tort law
Liability to services obtained
from subcontractors
Services to consumers Contract law
Legal venue/legislation Subject to contract The Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulations 1999 give
courts the power to regulate
unfair terms in standard
consumer contacts.
The Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulations 1999
give courts the power to
regulate unfair terms in standard
consumer contacts.
All contracts which involve
consumers, employment of labor or
financial and credit services are
regulated by statutes
(UK-Legislation)
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom










Fair dealings Contract law Legislation/fair dealing Legislation/fair dealing Contract law
Legislation Legislation
Non-legal rules Contracting in good faith
(Good faith is in UK a
non-legal requirement)
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between them (Mannix, Tinsley, & Bazerman, 1995).
4. Empirical study
The studywas an initial attempt to examine how theways inwhich
companies negotiate and make deals with each other contribute to
and are affected by what we have described as the constitution of
networks in which they operate. The empirical study took place in a
network that comprised suppliers of raw materials, multinational
grocery manufacturing companies, chains of grocery retailers and
consumers (for an overview see, Villas-Boas & Zhao, 2005). This
business network was chosen for investigation because it includes a
significant part of the British economy generating an annual turnover
of £100 billion. Between 2002 and 2005 we conducted 68 in-depth
interviews and 12 company workshops with 84 senior managers. The
data collection employed the case-study methodology (Easton, 1995;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Halinen & Törnoos, 2005; Ragin & Becker, 1992;
Tsoukas, 1989) and emphasized information on contemporary rules
and principles, legislation, customs and role behavior as well as
specific manifestations of inter-firm agreements. The critical exam-
ination, evaluation, categorization and recombination of empirical
data encountered four major challenges: the problem of network
boundaries, the problem of complexity, the problem of time and the
problem of comparison (Easton, 1995; Halinen & Törnoos, 2005).
Network boundaries are not fixed but are determined for each
observer by their particular focus of interest and knowledge. Thus, any
research delimitation of a network is arbitrary because actors are
interconnected throughout multiple ‘networks’. But nevertheless, in
order to make sense of the constitution of networks we needed to
move beyond the examination of dyadic relationships into those
manifestations of practices that exist across a number of actors. For
this reason we focused on the interaction between multiples of
a) manufacturers and retailers, b) manufacturers and consumers,
c) retailers and consumers and c) actors and public authorities and
analyzed the effect of their interactions on the development of
constitutions of networks. Over the period 2002–2005, we concen-
trated our attention on episodes which contributed to changes in the
constitutions of networks. We addressed the connections between
systems of conventions, such as legal and non-legal rules, and the
evolving patterns of interactions between manufacturers and retai-
lers. These patterns of interactions included institutionalized forms of
annual contract negotiations and business reviews as well as the
interactive processes among multiple actors. Our aimwas to evaluate,
test and determine the extent to which our knowledge claims do, or
do not, truly represent or correspond to the world (Hunt, 1976, 1983).Our primary goal in data analysis was to link the theoretical
knowledge with the empirical observations. We established this link
through several cycles, moving between theoretical ideas and data on
rules and principles as well as practices. We conducted an iterative
examination of the technologies of thought. These included business
plans, statutes, declarations, contract drafts, numbers and formulas as
well as memoranda of understanding. This process encouraged
conceptual dimensions of the theoretical model to emerge from the
data rather than being imposed on them.
4.1. What do constitutions of networks include?
We will now examine a variety of manifestations of constitution
and analyze their impact on the making and functioning of networks.
We have chosen to present these particular manifestations because of
their frequency of occurrence and application as agreed-upon
principles to resolve conflicts and controversial issues during
negotiations among companies. This will demonstrate that in many
cases, manifestations of the constitution of networks spell out a
framework for a continuing regulation of interaction among actors.
We will explore the advantages of constitutions of networks for
participants and highlight the situations in which companies find
them particularly useful, such as those involving the security and
calculability of exchanges. We will also show that the reasonable
expectations and central values enshrined in these manifestations of
the constitution of networks mean that managers can time and again
use them as a way-station to test their understanding of what is
feasible in their networks.
5. Discussion of empirical results
The manifestations presented in Table 1 demonstrate that the
function of the constitution of networks is to provide a shared system
of conventions that guides interaction among actors. The interactions
that take place between a number of actors in consumer goods
networks in the United Kingdom do not occur in a vacuum; they are
based on shared conventions. Manifestations of the constitution of
networks, such as those enshrined in property rights, electronic data
interchange, subcontracting rights, trade allowances, umbrella agree-
ments, brands, industry and quality standards, as well as statutes and
trade and industry rules draw upon bases of agreement that pre-exist
related actors to articulate a system of shared conventions (Choi,
1993; Lewis, 1967; Young, 1993). For example, there is a pre-existing
base of agreement that property rights for manufacturers' brands
remain a property that manufacturers own; and that manufacturers
need to pay trade allowances in order to obtain listing within retailers
500 S. Mouzas, D. Ford / Industrial Marketing Management 38 (2009) 495–503(Sullivan, 1997). The manifestations presented in Table 1 comprise
customary, expected, legal, and often non-legal rules and principles.
Their validity and legitimacy, however, is continuously redefined
through the evolution of consent over time among manufacturers,
retailers, consumers, public authorities and other related actors
(Barnett, 1986, 2003).
In our study, the consumer goods network is constituted by shared
systems of conventions that make possible the interaction and,
thereby, the conclusion of exchange between actors. Table 2 illustrates
this. Firstly, shared systems of conventions cope with the existence of
multilateral interaction among actors. Manifestations of property
rights, exclusivity or subcontracting rights, electronic data inter-
change, trade allowances, good faith and reciprocity rules provide
evidence of a multiplicity of interaction forms. This multiplicity of
interaction forms increases the degree of complexity and, thereby, the
need for transparency in the interaction process (Mouzas, Henneberg,
& Naudé, 2008). Secondly, shared systems of conventions attempt to
provide focal frames of mutually perceived expectations and shared
appreciations. In consumer goods networks, focal frames may include
umbrella agreements, domain consensus, quality standards, pre-
estimates or business valuations. These focal frames provide a sense
of direction which transforms the complexity of interaction among
manufacturers, retailers, consumers and public actors into joint
formulations of common ends. This transformation possibly occurs
because focal frames such as umbrella agreements are built upon each
actor's wider view of the interactions in order to preserve and refine
their substance (Ford et al., 2003; Mouzas & Ford, 2006; Sabel, 1994;
Stinchcombe, 2001). Thirdly, shared systems of conventions incorpo-
rate recursive time, in the sense of institutionalizing recurrent pattern
of episodes such as annual renegotiations, stock replenishment,
business reviews and meetings as well as sanctions and reputations.
Multilateral interactions, focal frames and recursive time constituted
the conceptual dimensions of a ‘topology’ or ‘podium’ of factual
physical and social conventions which shape the making and
functioning of consumer goods networks in the United Kingdom.
While in medieval England markets were created and organized by
individuals as fairs under the franchise of the King, the contemporary
consumer goods business in the United Kingdom is shaped by the use
of information technology, statutes, quality standards, trade associa-
tions and a series of non-legal but customary rules and principles.
Let us now examine how the three conceptual dimensions,
multilateral interactions, focal frames and recursive time impactTable 2
Networks constituted by shared systems of conventions.
Conceptual dimensions Shared systems of conventions






















Reputationsupon each other and evolve over time. This examination is best done
by linking the idea of constitutions of networks with the notion of
investments in network assets.2 Investing in factual, physical and
social artifacts of exchange practices creates externalities in the form
of ‘network assets’ that may be used by one company without limiting
their use by others (Cornes & Sandler, 1986; Johanson & Mattsson,
1985). Before the turn of the last century, for example, investments in
the use of information technology enabled radical changes and
establishment of new conventions in the way that manufacturers
and retailers arrange their information exchange, replenish their
inventories, manage their product categories or interact with
consumer. Consider the initial investment of retailer Wal-Mart in an
Electronic Data Interchange with manufacturer Procter and Gamble
which provided the basis for a specific form of Continuous Stock
Replenishment called Vendor Managed Inventory. The selection and
subsequent replication of this practice by the two companies
established a ‘network asset’ for other companies. Procter & Gamble
and Wal-Mart capitalized on the Electronic Data Interchange and
Continuous Stock Replenishment programs to implement further
exchanges with related third parties and, hence, committed further
resources for future use. Over recursive time, the actors' continuing
interactions and investments in these selected and recurrent practices
established a new order of conventions which became focal points for
multilateral interaction activities which are known in consumer goods
networks as Category Management and Efficient Consumer Response
(Araujo & Mouzas, 1999; Corsten & Kumar, 2005; Mouzas & Araujo,
2000). In this way, the dialectic impact of multilateral interactions,
focal frames and recursive time resulted in a re-shaping of the
constitution of consumer goods networks aimed at transforming a
range of existing practices and making the whole system accountable
to the final consumer.
5.1. How is the constitution of networks seen by actors?
Consumer goods markets demonstrate the existence of several,
heterogeneous, overlapping and, frequently, conflicting manifesta-
tions of constitution. These have been well documented in earlier
channel research (French, 1960; Mallen, 1964).3 Many of the
declarations issued by the Trade Associations or the International
Chamber of Commerce contain non-legal rules and principles of fair
dealings and standards that reflect legal rules defined in statutes such
as the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999
(Macdonald, 1999). Similarly, there is an overlap between different
manifestations. Category management systems, for example, overlap
with Efficient Consumer Response and Supply Management Systems,
and umbrella agreements often transform implicit norms which are
already embedded in customs into explicit norms for interaction
(Mouzas & Ford, 2006). Some of the shared conventions are regarded
as general constraints applied to multiple actors and areas. For
example, property rights, competition law, advertising restrictions or
ethical and communication standards apply to manufacturer brands
as well as to retailer brands.
We can identify a number of variations in the way that these
constitutions are seen. Some of them, such as statutes, contracts or
standards are binding, which means that the rules contained in these
manifestations are legally enforceable. Other constitutions contain
default or yielding rules (Ayres & Gertner, 1989; Riley, 2000) that are
non-mandatory but often self-enforcing. Manufacturers and retailers
usually conclude their interaction in accordance to default rules2 Often referred to as ‘market assets’.
3 Alexander and Hill (1958) tell an interesting story about the attempts of
manufacturers to enforce retail price control. A large New York store cut the price of
a well known fountain pen. The pen company employed so called Bowery bums to line
up at the counter to take advantage of the sale. To save fumigation costs the store
called off the whole affair.
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legal sanctions (Charny, 1990; Scott, 2003). These rules are valid for a
certain period and they are usually reconfirmed or reordered through
annual renegotiations, arbitration processes or court decisions. If rules
are confirmed and renewed over time, they establish a ‘principle’
which is an optimization command (Esser, 1956). For example, in
consumer goods networks there is an accepted principle that retailers
are entitled a substantial delay of payment (see Table 1). Hence,
retailers draw on manufacturers as trade creditors to provide working
capital for their retail stores (Sullivan, 1997). Manifestations of the
constitution of networks are, therefore, used by manufacturers and
retailers to resolve some controversial issues, such as allocation of
responsibilities, liabilities or gross margins. Nevertheless, the con-
stitution of networks is often disputed. This is evidenced, for example,
in the domain consensus between retailers and manufacturers.
Domain consensus is related to the definition of boundaries, role
sets and expectations in the relationship (Ford, 1978). The fact that
domains are often disputed and redefined over time is demonstrated
vividly in the engagement of the retailers in boosting retailer brands
(Dunne & Narasimhan, 1999). This tendency can be regarded as an
attempt by the retailers to invade domains that are traditionally the
preserve of manufacturers, to redefine role sets and to redraw the
boundaries of the network in which both retailers and manufacturers
are embedded. What happens if the constitution of networks is
disputed or breached? In the case of a breach of statute law or legally
binding regulations, the usual consequence for the violating company
is to pay a fine. Companies, however, rely increasingly on ‘non-legal
sanctions’ to enforce constitutions of networks. Non-legal sanctions
may take three different forms (Charny, 1990; Richman, 2004). First,
non-legal sanctions may involve the loss of relationship-specific
assets, such as the partial or complete loss of future business. Retail
chains, for example, often impose on consumer goods manufacturers
the non-legal sanction of brand de-listing. As umbrella agreements in
consumer goods networks are reviewed on an annual basis, a de-
listing of brands is often a rather ephemeral non-legal sanction.
Second, they may involve reputation costs. The problem with
reputation costs is that they are likely to be ineffective in hetero-
geneous and large business sectors. Third, non-legal sanctions may
also involve the loss of access to business networks and strategic
alliances or the sacrifice of status privileges. Such a sacrifice is the loss
of a ‘preferred supplier’ status or ‘category captain’ status, which are
reserved for the exceptional contractual partners. These empirical
observations are in linewith recent studies of one hundred and thirty-
seven litigated cases in the USA that demonstrate that businesses are
indifferent to legal enforcement because they are able to create
efficient non-legal mechanisms (Scott, 2003).
6. Conclusions
On the basis of this empirical study in important consumer goods
networks in the United Kingdom, it is apparent that we can identify a
constitution of the network that defines the topology of the business
landscape. This constitution provides a framework for the interaction
between actors such as manufacturers, retailers, consumers or public
authorities. The constitution of the network comprises shared systems
of conventions of legal and non-legal rules which express the actors'
appreciations and expectations about how they and others should
conduct business. The empirical work in this study demonstrates the
importance of distinguishing between values and expectations that
may exist within actors, within specific relationship level or more
widely across different areas of a network such as groups of
manufacturers or retailers or within the heterogeneous set of actors
that comprise the totality of the network. We conclude from the study
that the idea of constitutions of networks is useful for the analysis of
networks and interaction within them as it constitutes an additional
and important dimension of the current and evolving views of actorsthat is likely to form the basis for evaluation of innovations or changes
in practices. An interesting issuewhich is not addressed in this study is
the extent to which the constitutions of networks are explicit,
formalized, legal, non-legal or illegal and the extent to which they
are viewed in the sameway by all actors in either similar companies or
across the network. It is also interesting to conjecture about variations
in these constitutions in different networks having different char-
acteristics. For example, we would expect more explicit constitutions
and widely held commonality of views in older and more stable
networks, where mutual knowledge of each other and the ‘workings’
of the network were well developed. It may also be in these networks
that there is a greater likelihood that constitutions may take the form
of illegal cartels or restraints on trade.
This empirical study demonstrates that consumer goods networks
are arrangements that have evolved over time as an intended or
unintended outcome of the actors' effort to interact. In this effort, the
constitution of networks delivers shared systems of conventions that
facilitate the realization of interaction practice among actors. These
conventions cope with the existence of multilateral interaction, allow
the creation of focal frames and enable recurrent episodes over
recursive time. For this reason, we can conclude that there is a
dialectic relationship between ‘interaction’ and ‘constitutions’. This is
demonstrated in the existence of market assets such as electronic data
interchange, continuous replenishment systems, EAN codes, or
institutionalized forms of annual negotiations created through
investments in factual, physical and social artifacts. In this way, the
present study introduced the term constitution of networks in an
attempt to link interaction and networks. In practical terms, this
implies that research on markets needs to include the investigation
and analysis of interaction practice among actors as well as the
analysis of the consequences of these interactions. The present study
has shown the importance of shared systems of conventions in the
realization of interaction practice. Empirical research on how
companies in different industries, with different backgrounds,
potentials and interests undertake jointly agreed action may improve
our understanding of the dynamic interplay between interaction and
constitutions and may contribute to a new comprehensive theory.
Such a research theme comes at a timewhen a range of factors, such as
globalization, financial market changes, mergers and acquisitions and
outsourcing are forcing many companies to reconsider their practices.
Companies are susceptible to changes in their context and have to
negotiate with other companies to protect and advance their own
interests. An agenda for further research, therefore, needs to include
an investigation of how companies deal with the security and
calculability of interactions in their particular contexts and how
companies see this issue as a possibility of exploring and exploiting
new opportunities. Looking at the conceptual dimensions of multi-
lateral interaction, focal frames and recursive time, further research
may explore how companies negotiate and manifest the achievement
of shared systems of conventions and how these conventions are
impacted by or impact on their own practices.
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